Sustained growth in both incomes and life spans are the hallmarks of modern development. Fluctuations around trend in the former, or business cycles, have been a traditional focus in macroeconomics, while similar cyclical patterns in mortality are also interesting and are now increasingly studied. In this paper, I assess the welfare implications of cyclical fluctuations in mortality using a new utility-theoretic model of preferences over uncertain length of life. Echoing the classic result of Lucas (1987) regarding business cycles, my findings suggest that short-term fluctuations in mortality are not very costly. While consumption fluctuations are relatively large, cyclical fluctuations in mortality are tiny compared to the much larger static uncertainty in length of life that derives from naturally rising mortality rates through age. Secular improvements in life expectancy and gains against static health inequalities appear to be much more important than cyclical mortality.
Introduction
To paraphrase and adapt a famous quote by Lucas (1988) , once we start to think about the long-term secular increases in human longevity that have accompanied modern growth, it is hard to think about anything else. Period life expectancy, or the average life span for a representative individual who lives his or her entire life in a period, has increased at an average annual clip of about 0.2 year across industrialized countries since 1955 (White, 2002; Oeppen and Vaupel, 2002; Hall and Jones, 2007) .
Against this backdrop of continued improvements in life span over the long run, we can also identify sizeable short-run uctuations in mortality that look like business cycles. The top panel in Figure 1 overlays plots of the log age and sex-adjusted aggregate mortality rate, the log of real GDP per capita, and their trends estimated using the Hodrick and Prescott (1997) lter. The bottom panel replaces log mortality with period life expectancy at birth. All three series oscillate around their long-run trends.
1 Especially past 1950, uctuations in log mortality appear larger than those in life expectancy because of the historical compression of mortality.
2
Aside from the near simultaneity of the World War I economic boom and the massive spike in mortality due to the Spanish inuenza outbreak, it is difcult to see any connection between the uctuations in log mortality and in real income, which are trending in different directions in the top panel of Figure 1 . It is somewhat easier to see short-run correlation in the lower panel, where life expectancy and income are both increasing. The faint picture that emerges is rather unexpected: life expectancy seems to fall below its trend when GDP is abnormally high and rise above it when GDP is low. That is, the long-run positive relationship between life expectancy and income appears to be reversed in the short run. Lower-frequency 1 The time-series properties of these data are the focus of much research, and I offer no new insights here. Unit roots are often posited in both cases; Lee and Carter (1992) propose a model for log age-specic mortality rates with a unit root, while Nelson and Plosser (1982) are unable to reject a unit root in U.S. national income data. In this paper, I rst provide a visual analysis in Figure 1 of the series and their trends as estimated by the Hodrick and Prescott (1997) lter. In my empirical analyses, I examine rst differences in log mortality and log income because it is analytically convenient and standard in the literature. Tapia Granados (2005) discusses in greater detail the time-series properties of mortality and GDP in the context of exploring the links between them.
2 As described by Edwards and Tuljapurkar (2005) and others, the dispersion of mortality across ages, which they measure as the standard deviation in length of life and can also be indexed by the entropy of life-table survivorship, was high prior to 1950 owing to the universally higher risk of death from infectious disease. As explained by Goldman and Lord (1986) and also mentioned by Lee and Carter (1992) , given some level of volatility in mortality rates, volatility in life expectancy declines as entropy declines. Bell and Miller (2005) ; in 1947 and later they are data for both sexes combined from Human Mortality Database (2006) . Trends are calculated using the Hodrick and Prescott (1997) lter with smoothing parameter γ = 100, per Backus and Kehoe (1992). swings in the trend lines themselves also support this view, with hourglass-shaped gaps appearing between them.
This perspective, that life expectancy appears to be countercyclical and mortality procyclical, is clearly at odds not only with the long-run relationship but also with the traditional perspective on mortality in the short run (Brenner, 1971 (Brenner, , 1975 (Brenner, , 1979 (Brenner, , 2005 . But as revealed by Ruhm (2000 Ruhm ( , 2003 Ruhm ( , 2007 Ruhm ( , 2008 , Neumayer (2004) , Tapia Granados (2005) , Gerdtham and Ruhm (2006) , Edwards (2008b) and others, an expanding body of evidence suggests that macroeconomic good times, or business cycle expansions, seem to be bad for population health. Trafc accidents appear to be strongly procyclical, but so do cardiovascular disease and other stressrelated ailments, suggesting relatively broad incidence.
To be sure, these results do not necessarily contradict the nding that job loss is harmful to the health and well-being of individuals who are laid off. It could be that reductions in job stress and risk taking among the employed during a recession could produce a positive net effect on population health even though the jobless minority are negatively affected (Catalano and Bellows, 2005) . Still, it is remarkable that the traditional normative perspective on uctuations vis-à-vis the common good should be effectively turned inside-out. I began this paper by paraphrasing Lucas; can it be that we have arrived at Keynes (1924) , but only to turn him on his head, not once but twice? "In the long run we are all dead" not only rings less true given the strong upward trend in longevity, but in fact we may be dead in the short run, and moreover during good economic times, not the bad times that Keynes was implicitly arguing we could and should avert.
Work continues in this subeld, but a critical question that has remained unanswered is how costly are procyclical uctuations in mortality, or more generally all cyclical uctuations in mortality? The answer is important for guiding research and for informing policy in the same way that the cost of business cycles is an important parameter.
In this paper, I estimate the economic cost of cyclical mortality using a new utility-theoretic framework. The basic setup of my model is similar to that proposed by Lucas (1987) in his classic accounting of the cost of business cycles, and my results are qualitatively and quantitatively very similar. The welfare cost of cyclical mortality, whether tied to business cycles or not, appears to be extremely small. It is small both in an absolute sense and relative to either the benets of continuing increases in average life expectancy or to the large cost of static uncertainty in life spans, which I consider in a related paper (Edwards, 2008a) . This is partly because uctuations around the upward trend in life expectancy, as shown in Figure  1 , are both small and evenly distributed on either side of the trend, so that the costs of higher mortality during expansions are partially offset by the benets of lower mortality during recessions. More importantly, and in direct contrast to the relatively large volatility in consumption considered by Lucas, cyclical mortality adds only a very small amount to the total uncertainty in length of life. Utility curvature also plays a role, as it does for Lucas, but the basic result is driven by the relatively small contribution of cyclical mortality to variance. This is not to say that we should ignore the plight of vulnerable groups who may disproportionately bear the cost. Nor should it imply that increasing life expectancy is necessarily preferable to all other pursuits, which can include reducing costly health inequalities. My results simply suggest that temporary uctuations in average mortality, while interesting, are probably not a key public health priority.
In the rest of the paper I build my case for pricing cyclical mortality. I begin by reviewing estimates of the size and shape of uctuations in mortality rates. I discuss the difculty in conceptualizing the cost of an uncertain mortality rate, and then I present a method of translating it into the cost of uncertain life span. Then, drawing on related work that examines the latter (Edwards, 2008a) , I propose a means of pricing cyclical mortality for a representative individual. With it I recover an estimate of the cost that is small and similar in magnitude to the cost of business cycles recovered by Lucas (1987 Lucas ( , 2003 . Finally, I discuss the implications of my results.
Quantifying cyclical mortality
As suggested by Figure 1 , one could stochastically model either log mortality or period life expectancy rather interchangeably. The standard practice in the literature on procyclical mortality is to model mortality rates, in part because they are simpler to measure among population subgroups dened by age, sex, or other characteristic. Forecasts often focus on mortality rates as well, since demographers have typically viewed the dominant temporal trend as proportional decline in mortality rates (Lee and Carter, 1992; White, 2002) . Lee and Carter (1992) propose modeling log age-specic mortality rates as a random walk with drift, a specication that captures over 90 percent of the variation. I t a simplied version of their model to the post-1946 mortality data shown in the top panel of Figure 1 . My choice of sample period is motivated by increased stability in both mortality and macroeconomic variables. Ordinary least squares estimation reveals
where m t is the age and sex-adjusted mortality rate, and standard errors are in parentheses. It is straightforward to introduce a stationary covariate in order to explore how mortality responds to the business cycle. The most common choice in the procyclical mortality literature is the level or change in the unemployment rate. Here, I use the change in log GDP per capita, which is also standard:
The coefcient on ∆ log GDP , call it γ = 0.2607, ts neatly into the range of estimates reported by Tapia Granados (2005) . Faster growth in GDP of one percentage point is associated with about a quarter percentage point slowdown in mortality decline, which has averaged 1.07 percent each year per equation (1). As for GDP growth, a simple analogue of equation (1) reveals
In equation (2) there are two sources of uctuations in the rate of decline in mortality: t and γ · ν t , the shock to the growth rate of GDP that is transmitted to the growth rate of mortality. These parameter estimates imply that procyclical mortality, the component associated with macroeconomic uctuations, is responsible for a standard deviation of γ · σ ν = 0.0063, while other sources of cyclical mortality comprise σ = 0.0172, or a level almost three times larger.
A theoretical valuation of cyclical mortality Translating mortality into length of life
Results so far have revealed the degree of uncertainty in mortality rates, and we wish to gauge its welfare cost. Economic theory allows us to price uncertainty in rates of return; for example, by using the Consumption CAPM or related models. But there is no extant theory regarding how to price uncertainty in rates of death.
I argue that this requires translating uncertainty in mortality rates into uncertainty in the length of life. This is because standard economic models fail to capture risk aversion over mortality rates, while they can appropriately model risk aversion over length of life. The standard model of expected lifetime utility is
where δ is the time discount rate, and m(t) is the mortality rate, a random variable. A mean-preserving spread in a particular m(t) actually raises expected utility in equation (4) Instead of modeling variance in the mortality rate, it is helpful to focus on life span, and to decompose uncertainty in length of life into two conceptually distinct components. We can dene life-table uncertainty as the inherent spread in length of life around its mean that arises when mortality rates rise with age.
3 A convenient visualization of life-table uncertainty is the probability density function of life spans or life-table deaths in a particular year. Figure 2 shows this distribution for the U.S. in 1999. The mean, which was about 77 that year, is also known as period life expectancy at birth, which is shown over time in the lower panel of Figure 1 . Smooth increases in the mean over time have been fully consistent with a xed amount of life-table uncertainty as measured by the standard deviation of life span when the latter is primarily old-age mortality (Edwards and Tuljapurkar, 2005) .
In contrast, temporal uncertainty in life span can be dened as the volatility in the mean length of life around its long-run trend, which is visible as the oscillations in Figure 1 . This is a residual category that encompasses the very same concept of cyclical mortality we have already considered, but reinterpreted in a convenient fashion that will become clear shortly.
This decomposition is useful because we can treat both components of uncertainty in length of life as isomorphic, even though they are conceptually distinct. The two panels in Figure 3 reveal this insight graphically using actual data for the U.S. in 1999. The solid line in the top panel depicts the age schedule of log mortality, which to a rst approximation is a Gompertz (1825) curve:
where x is age, t is time, and α and β are constants. 4 Mortality rises gradually with age through the β parameter, which equals 0.087 in 1999. Equation (5) If the cyclical shocks to the rst difference in log mortality from equations (2) and (3), t + γ · ν t , are constant across age, 5 then we can rewrite equation (5) to include temporal uncertainty as well. The level of log mortality must be subject to a shock with half the variance of the shock that impinges the difference:
It is easy to see that the cyclical disturbance term, t + γ · ν t , simply shifts the entire mortality schedule up or down. This dynamic is shown by the dashed schedules on either side of the solid line in the top panel of Figure 3 . A more subtle insight is that this additive translation is equivalent to shifting the schedule left or right, or like an 4 Mortality at very young and very old ages clearly does not follow this schedule, but total deaths are few at both extremes. For ease of exposition, I assume α and β do not change over time, but my results do not depend on this rather unrealistic simplication. A good t of recent temporal trends in mortality can be obtained by allowing the Gompertz intercept to decrease linearly, α t =ᾱ − gt for some constant g, while setting the slope at β t =β and thus xing the adult life-table uncertainty (Tuljapurkar and Edwards, 2008) . Under these circumstances, equation (5) implies that ∆ log m x = −g, which is analogous to equation (1).
5 Although this is an approximation, it is a relatively good one. Tapia Granados (2005) shows there are some differences in the incidence of procyclical mortality across groups dened by age, race, and sex, and Edwards (2008b) reveals that there may be some differences across educational groups. But as Ruhm (2008) and others have remarked, the phenomenon is remarkably wide-ranging in scope, affecting young and old similarly. Since the bulk of mortality occurs during late working age and retirement, two broad age groups that appear to be similarly affected by procyclical mortality, the assumption of uniform incidence is convenient and appears to be relatively benign. 
Redening age in this way changes only the mean of the life-table death distribution while leaving centered moments unaffected. This is shown by the addition of dashed lines in the the bottom panel of Figure 3 , which plots the corresponding distributions of life-table deaths by age in 1999. 6 The upshot is that we can reinterpret cyclical mortality as additional life-table uncertainty in length of life. This is because more uncertainty in the mean length of life is approximately equivalent to more variance in the distribution around a known mean. When they are uncorrelated, life-table uncertainty and short-run temporal uncertainty are just additive layerings of the same uncertainty around life span. Once we know how to price the former, we can price the latter and the total.
To summarize, suppose that in the absence of temporal uncertainty, the length of life, now T rather than x, is normally distributed with mean µ T and variance σ 2 T , where σ 2 T represents only the life-table uncertainty in T . As revealed by equation (7), we can interpret temporal uncertainty as shifting the mean age µ T by
That is a normally distributed disturbance that we can reinterpret as additional variance around µ T . Then if life-table uncertainty and temporal uncertainty are independent, the resulting distribution of length of life T becomes
Valuing uncertainty in length of life
Now that I have translated cyclical mortality into additional life-span uncertainty, what remains is to place a value on the latter. Edwards (2008a) proposes a new method of pricing life-span uncertainty using a standard model of intertemporal 6 In both panels, I have set an arbitrarily large vertical distance between adjacent schedules at t + γ · ν t = 0.435 for expository purposes. A 43.5 percent difference in mortality rates would be very large indeed, given that the average annual rate of mortality decline is about 1 percent. As shown, the Gompertz slope, β, allows us to convert that 0.435 into a horizontal difference of 5 years on either side of the original schedule in the upper panel. 7 To be sure, independence is not a prerequisite if the covariance structure were known. Visually, there appears to be little relationship between short-run uctuations in life-table uncertainty, as reported by Edwards and Tuljapurkar (2005) , and uctuations in mortality decline. Their preferred measure of the former is S 10 , the standard deviation in the age at death above age 10. A simple OLS regression of the change in S 10 on the change in life expectancy, e 0 , in U.S. data since 1947 reveals no signicant relationship between them (t-statistic of 0.04). choice in economics. That paper focuses on the consequences of large differences in static life-table uncertainty across countries at points in time and within countries over long periods of time, while this paper examines the cost of short-run temporal uctuations. I provide a brief overview of the method here.
The problem requires nding the marginal disutility of uncertainty in length of life, which in a standard intertemporal model like equation (4), primarily depends on the rate of time discounting. To see why, consider intertemporal choice under full annuitization.
8 Consumption does not respond to variance in length of life, and it is at over time atc if the rates of time discounting and interest are equal. Under these conditions, lifetime utility is
which is the constant absolute risk aversion (CARA) utility function with the discount rate δ as the coefcient of absolute risk aversion in length of life (Edwards, 2008a) . 9 The intuition behind this result is that a mean-preserving spread in life span exchanges utility earlier in time, which is less heavily discounted and thus more valuable, for more heavily discounted utility later.
An analytical representation of the cost of uncertain life span can be derived when wealth is fully annuitized, markets are complete, there is no other source of risk, utility is isoelastic, and life span is normally distributed 10 with mean M and variance S 2 . Under those conditions, maximization of equation (4) subject to a standard budget constraint implies that (indirect) expected lifetime utility is
where C is a constant that depends on lifetime wealth. The price of a standard deviation in life span, S, in terms of the mean, M, is the marginal rate of substitution 8 Although it may seem counterintuitive, even full annuitization of wealth does not fully hedge utility against life-span risk. This is apparent in (9) and discussed at greater length in Edwards (2008a) . 9 Bommier (2006) considers a more general specication of preferences with an independent parameter governing risk aversion over length of life. Experimental data are rare, and no calibration is provided. It remains to be seen whether the empirical degree of risk aversion over life span is greater or less than that implied by time discounting alone. 10 The distribution of human life span is skew-left and leptokurtic, as shown in Figures 2 and  3 . Under fully realistic mortality, which also includes a spike at birth and infancy, equation (10) loses accuracy and the cost of uncertain life span becomes somewhat higher than the p S given in equation (11). This is because skewness and the infant spike remove more utility earlier in life than when length of life is normally distributed as in equation (10). But equation (11) between them:
The cost of an additional year in standard deviation is equal to the discount rate times the current level of a standard deviation in life span. Additional life-table uncertainty is costlier when the time discount rate is higher or when there is more uncertainty. When combined with earlier results, equation (11) reveals the cost of cyclical mortality insofar as it contributes to S, the standard deviation in length of life, the square of which is the variance shown in equation (8).
Calibrating the cost of cyclical mortality
As shown by Edwards and Tuljapurkar (2005) , total uncertainty in adult life span in the U.S. has oscillated around S = 15 years since 1960. This is considerably higher than uncertainty in low-variance countries like Sweden and Japan, where currently S = 13 after gradual but continuous declines during the same period. A standard estimate of the time discount rate is δ = 0.03 (Becker et al., 2005) . Given that, equation (11) implies that the two-year difference in S we see between the U.S. and other industrialized countries is worth about one year in M. We can convert this to dollars using a price of $200,000 per life year, which is roughly the average estimate according to Tolley, Kenkel and Fabian (1994) after updating for ination. These results imply that static differences between countries in the level of life-table uncertainty around length of life are relatively large (Edwards, 2008a) .
The decomposition of the total variance in length of life, S 2 in equation (8), combined with the calibration results from equations (2) and (3) reveal that temporal uncertainty is small relative to life-table uncertainty. When σ 2 T = 15, β = 0.087, σ = 0.0172, γ = 0.2607, and σ ν = 0.0241, we nd that equation (8) Temporal uncertainty, whether associated with the business cycle or not, adds only about 0.0007 year to the standard deviation in length of life, S. Taken alone, procyclical mortality adds only about 0.0001. Because temporal uncertainty contributes so very little to S, the cost of cyclical mortality according to this framework is extremely low. At $200,000 per life year, the cost of an additional 0.0007 year in standard deviation comes out to just $70.
The procyclical mortality piece on the far right of equation (12) is responsible for only $10 of the $70.
Discussion
This paper has shown that a standard model of intertemporal utility maximization attaches a vanishingly small average welfare cost to cyclical mortality, perhaps $70 per person each year. The result itself closely mirrors those of Lucas (1987 Lucas ( , 2003 , who considers the welfare cost of consumption uctuations during business cycles. Using a representative agent model, Lucas recovers an estimate of about onetwentieth of 1 percent of consumption, or about $20 per person. Compared to these negligible costs, the gains accruing from secular growth in incomes and life spans are overwhelmingly larger. Annual growth in consumption has averaged 2 percent. The value of annual gains in longevity, which have averaged 0.2 year, is roughly equal to annual gains in consumption (Nordhaus, 2003) .
But although Lucas (1987 Lucas ( , 2003 and I start with essentially the same theoretical framework, the reason I nd a tiny cost of cyclical mortality is different than the reason Lucas nds a tiny cost of cyclical consumption. Both papers assume a representative agent with access to complete markets and only a moderate level of risk aversion, either over uctuations in consumption or in length of life. In either case, these preferences are arguably appropriate for the average consumer, although in reality there is considerable heterogeneity in preferences that may be meaningful if markets are incomplete. Lucas attaches a low cost to consumption volatility, which is relatively large with a standard deviation around trend of 3.2 percent, because utility curvature or risk aversion is not high. In contrast, the reason why cyclical mortality is virtually costless is because it is trivially small compared to the much larger life-table uncertainty in length of life. Standard estimates of the relevant utility curvature parameter, namely the time discount rate, actually suggest the latter is very costly (Edwards, 2008a) .
The same caveats about the correct level of utility curvature apply to both the work by Lucas and my own, and they may seem particularly salient here. The true degree of risk aversion over periods of life could be different than the time discount rate. This is a topic that is only beginning to be explored, and a more complete answer awaits future inquiry. 11 We know from nancial economics that attitudes 11 As reviewed by Edwards (2008a) , there is empirical evidence that individuals are risk averse over years of life. But there is no clear consensus in health economics about whether people perceive short and long-term risks to their physical well-being as economists think they should, or about how researchers should model preferences over length of life. Bommier (2006 Bommier ( , 2007 prefers a baseline model with greater risk aversion than implied by the standard framework of exponential time discounting that I use, but he provides no empirical support of this hypothesis. In his framework, agents toward risk and time preference are often more complicated than standard economic models suggest. Using nancial market data, Alvarez and Jermann (2004) estimate a much higher cost of business cycles than Lucas did, basically because of the equity risk premium puzzle. But because cyclical mortality is so small relative to total life-span uncertainty, it is unlikely that even signicantly higher risk aversion over length of life will change the fundamental result.
Differential incidence of cyclical mortality is a potentially critical issue that I have assumed away. This is because the extant literature currently points in no clear direction; the phenomenon of procyclical mortality seems to be quite broadly based. But it remains an open question whether some groups are disproportionately more at risk of poor health and death during uctuations. We know that different groups face different levels of life-table uncertainty, with lower socioeconomic status correlated with shorter as well as more uncertain length of life (Edwards and Tuljapurkar, 2005) . If there were differential incidence in cyclical mortality that favored the well-off, my results could change.
Another point that I do not directly consider is that some components of health and mortality could be endogenous. Procyclical mortality actually hedges consumption risk by reducing health and survivorship during economic good times when consumption is high. Conversely, being temporarily out of work may be costly in terms of consumption, but it also appears to reward with improved health. With such negative covariance between health and consumption, the total cost of business cycle uctuations measured along both dimensions must be less than if the covariance were zero or positive. Is this mere coincidence, unintended consequence, or evidence of rational hedging behavior?
To be sure, only a small portion of all temporal uncertainty in mortality is attributable to business cycle uctuations. Thus the hedging benet of procyclical mortality is unlikely to outweigh the total cost of uctuating mortality. But the negative covariance between survivorship and consumption raises the interesting question of whether consumers are aware of the health costs of working and are already optimizing. Working less when productivity is temporarily low, for example, may be particularly attractive because of the health benets. But the broad incidence of procyclical mortality, across many age groups and not just working ages, certainly suggests there may be externalities. Revisiting this issue is likely to be a fruitful pursuit, whether along theoretical lines with joint uncertainty in life span shift consumption earlier in life in order to hedge against uncertain life span even if they are fully annuitized. When time discounting is exponential, as I assume, fully annuitized agents do not shift consumption in response to changing life-span uncertainty, although they are still hurt by it. Without more data on actual preferences over length of life, it is difcult to assess the empirical degree of risk aversion, and much work remains to be done in this subeld. In the meantime, it seems reasonable to proceed with standard modeling techniques and calibration settings, as I have here. and consumption, or with an empirical exploration of how the two vary over time among individuals.
My results certainly do not diminish the catastrophic nature of the 1918 inuenza pandemic or other large but temporary adverse shocks to mortality. Lucas's insights did not controvert the accepted view that the costs of the Great Depression were staggering. But my results do suggest that as a society, it appears that we should focus relatively more of our energies toward reducing static health inequalities and maintaining overall progress against mortality rather than weathering the vicissitudes. In any event, as discussed by Edwards (2005) and Catalano and Bellows (2005) , it is not entirely clear what the policy options for reducing procyclical mortality would be. Would we ever trigger a recession in order to improve public health? Put less blithely, traditional social safety nets such as Medicaid in the U.S. offer countercyclical benets by design (Edwards, 2005) . It is hard to conceive of literally reversing such policies in order to combat procyclical mortality without causing signicant harm.
